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LECTURE
“HOLDING THE DELICATE BALANCE
STEADY AND TRUE”:
THE HISTORY OF FISA’S GRAND BARGAIN
The Honorable Richard C. Tallman* & Tania M. Culbertson**
I. INTRODUCTION
Good evening. I am honored to be asked to deliver this lecture named
in honor of a great Montanan and my beloved colleague for several years
before his passing. Judge Jim Browning remains a legend on our court and
this lecture series is a fitting tribute to a brilliant jurist and genuinely caring
human being. We all miss him.
In 2008, then-Chief Judge Bruce Selya, while serving on the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, which we call the FISCR, ar-
ticulated the mission statement of the judiciary when reviewing the domes-
tic surveillance powers exercised by the United States in furtherance of na-
tional security:
Our government is tasked with protecting an interest of utmost significance
to the nation—the safety and security of its people. But the Constitution is
the cornerstone of our freedoms, and government cannot unilaterally sacri-
fice constitutional rights on the altar of national security. Thus, in carrying
out its national security mission, the government must simultaneously fulfill
its constitutional responsibility to provide reasonable protections for the pri-
* Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit and Judge on the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court of Review
* Career Law Clerk to Judge Tallman. The authors wish to thank Professor Bobby Chesney and
Professor Steve Vladeck for their National Security Law Podcast three-part series on the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act, from which some of the themes in this lecture are drawn. The first of the three-
part series is found here: https://www.nationalsecuritylawpodcast.com/episode-96-a-deep-dive-into-the-
foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act/ (last visited May 19, 2019).
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vacy of United States persons. The judiciary’s duty is to hold that delicate
balance steady and true.1
Tonight, I will explain what led to the passage of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) and its creation of the FISA courts, and
describe the grand bargain that was struck between our three branches of
government when creating FISA’s judicial review procedures over domes-
tic espionage and counter-terrorism investigations. My hope is to leave you
with a keener understanding of how we have arrived at where we are today,
and how the judiciary understands its oversight role within FISA’s statutory
framework and under our Constitution.
A word of caution: as a currently-serving judge on the FISCR, charged
with reviewing sensitive classified matters, I will not be discussing with
you any of the cases underlying the more sensational news items concern-
ing the FISA courts that you may have heard or read about over the past
few years. My talk will deal with history more than with current events. I
begin with a brief overview of the current structure of the United States
Intelligence Community in order to provide you with a sense of its scope,
and then I will turn to the history and case law that led to FISA’s passage
and subsequent evolution. I will close by reiterating the key concepts I hope
you take away from my lecture to aid you in understanding what the FISA
framework requires the judiciary to weigh in considering the substantial
questions of constitutional law impacting the privacy-versus-security de-
bate, which continues to this day. As judges, we do this work in order to
ensure that we all remain safe and secure while holding steadfast our fealty
to the cornerstone of our freedoms.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
When you think of intelligence agencies, you probably think of the
Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”), and the National Security Agency (“NSA”). And, in fact, prior to
2004, the United States Intelligence Community was supervised by the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, who also oversaw the CIA. But in 2004, as
part of its response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress
passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act which,
among other things, established the Office of the Director of National Intel-
ligence (“ODNI”) to better unify and manage the efforts of the Intelligence
Community.2
1. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d
1004, 1016 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
2. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458, 118 Stat.
3638.
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 80 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/1
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-2\MON201.txt unknown Seq: 3  1-AUG-19 11:49
2019 THE HISTORY OF FISA’S GRAND BARGAIN 139
In the words of the ODNI, the “U.S. Intelligence Community is a fed-
eration of executive branch agencies and organizations that work separately
and together to conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of
foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the United
States.”3 The ODNI supervises the gathering and analysis of intelligence for
the President, the National Security Council, the heads of departments and
agencies of the executive branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and senior military commanders, and Congress.4
In addition to the ODNI, the U.S. Intelligence Community members
include the CIA—an independent agency—and various agencies and the
military branches within the Departments of Defense (including the NSA),
Energy, Homeland Security, Justice (including the FBI and the DEA),
State, and Treasury.5 These members, to varying degrees, oversee or em-
ploy six basic intelligence collection disciplines: (1) signals intelligence
(think: the NSA); (2) human intelligence (think: not just espionage, but also
overt collection by, for example, de-briefers and military attachés); (3) im-
agery intelligence (think: photography, film, and radar, among others); (4)
geospatial intelligence (think: satellites); (5) open source intelligence
(think: the same news sources you review); and, (6) likely of least familiar-
ity to you, measurement and signature intelligence, which is technically de-
rived intelligence data other than imagery or signals intelligence that draws
from various disciplines—for instance, optical, acoustic, seismic, and
materials sciences.6 An example of acoustical intelligence is capturing the
sonar “signature” of a ballistic missile submarine as it cruises underwater.
As you can see, the distinct members of the Intelligence Community make
up a complex and highly-technical network, which is important to bear in
mind as we look at the evolution of the legal framework used to govern
sophisticated intelligence gathering in the modern era, including the ways in
which technological developments drive that evolution.
III. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS DRIVE THE “MODERN ERA” OF
SURVEILLANCE LAW, AND THE CHECKS AND BALANCES BETWEEN
THE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT BEGIN
We begin our discussion of the history of electronic surveillance law
with the Supreme Court’s 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States,7
3. See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, What is Intelligence?, OFFICE OF THE DIREC-
TOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (April 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/6ZLX-WEGW.
4. Id.
5. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Members of the IC, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (April 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/4QXG-58W9.
6. What is Intelligence?, supra note 3. R
7. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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which addressed the question of whether “the use of evidence of private
telephone conversations between the defendants and others, intercepted by
means of wiretapping, amounted to a violation of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.”8 The case actually arose in my former duty station of Seat-
tle, Washington, where petitioners plus some seventy-two others were in-
dicted for violations of the National Prohibition Act—in other words, boot-
legging whiskey on a scale so grand that it involved numerous cargo ves-
sels, underground storage caches, “a central office manned with operators,
and the employment of executives, salesmen, deliverymen dispatchers,
scouts, bookkeepers, collectors, and an attorney.”9
The information which led to the discovery of the liquor conspiracy
was largely obtained from wiretaps clipped to the ordinary telephone wires
leading from the residences of the petitioners and from the basement of the
central office building.10 Importantly, the taps were installed “without tres-
pass upon any property of the defendants.”11 One of the questions before
the Supreme Court, then, was whether a wiretap was the kind of qualifying
search protected by the Fourth Amendment, which provides: “The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.”12
Here is what the Court decided: “The amendment does not forbid what
was done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence
was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no
entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”13 Although this sounds
surprising to us now in light of subsequent case law, the Supreme Court in
1928 held that wiretapping simply was not the kind of search against which
the Fourth Amendment protects. But the Court also issued an explicit invi-
tation to Congress to legislate in this arena, writing, “Congress may, of
course, protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when
intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by direct
legislation.”14 And that is what Congress did in the Communications Act of
1934.15 So here, I submit to you, is an example of a technological develop-
ment—the widespread use of Alexander Graham Bell’s new telephone—
8. Id. at 456.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 456–57.
11. Id. at 457.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
14. Id. at 465.
15. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–624 (2018).
4
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causing the judicial branch to answer a novel legal question about the inves-
tigatory powers of the executive branch. But when the legislative branch
did not like the answer given by the judiciary, it stepped in to adjust the
balance by statute.
The Communications Act of 1934 combined and organized federal
regulation of telephone, telegraph, and radio communications, and created a
new agency, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), to oversee
and regulate these industries.16 And as written in 1934, it provided, among
other things, that “no person not being authorized by the sender shall inter-
cept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to
any person,” on threat of fines and imprisonment for willful and knowing
violations.17 In 1937, in Nardone v. United States,18 the Supreme Court had
to decide whether, in view of these statutory provisions, “evidence procured
by a federal officer’s tapping telephone wires and intercepting messages”
was admissible in a federal criminal trial.19 It concluded that, “[t]aken at
face value the phrase ‘no person’ comprehends federal agents, and the ban
on communication to ‘any person’ bars testimony to the content of an inter-
cepted message.”20
In response to the government’s argument that surely Congress did not
intend to “hamper and impede the activities of the government in the detec-
tion and punishment of crime,” the Court responded that it would not ad-
dress this policy question and that “Congress may have thought it less im-
portant that some offenders should go unwhipped of justice than that of-
ficers should resort to methods deemed inconsistent with ethical standards
and destructive of personal liberty.”21 Again, we see the judiciary acknowl-
edging that it is the responsibility of the legislative branch to adjust the
balance when it comes to privacy issues.
But the judiciary has a role in protecting privacy too. In the case of
Katz v. United States,22 in 1967, the Supreme Court once again examined
the question whether the Fourth Amendment protects against electronic sur-
veillance, and this time it reached a somewhat different conclusion than in
Olmstead. In Katz, the petitioner was charged with transmitting illegal bets
from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston using a public payphone in an
enclosed booth.23 Federal agents had placed a listening device on the
16. Communications Act of 1934, c. 652, Title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064.
17. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 380–81 (1937) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934)).
18. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
19. Id. at 380.
20. Id. at 381.
21. Id. at 383.
22. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23. Id. at 348.
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outside of the phone booth without obtaining a warrant, and Mr. Katz asked
the Supreme Court to decide “[w]hether a public telephone booth is a con-
stitutionally protected area so that evidence obtained by attaching an elec-
tronic listening recording device to the top of such a booth is obtained in
violation of the right to privacy of the user of the booth.”24
Rather than answering that question directly, the Supreme Court came
up with a different formulation: “[T]his effort to decide whether or not a
given ‘area,’ viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’ deflects
attention from the problem presented by this case.”25 The Court continued,
“For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . . But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”26 Accordingly, the Court held that “[t]he Government’s activi-
ties in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words vio-
lated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone
booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.”27 Or, in the words of Justice Harlan’s concurrence—
the language with which you are likely all familiar—the unauthorized lis-
tening device violated Katz’s “constitutionally protected reasonable expec-
tation of privacy.”28
In the wake of the Katz case, and in response to investigations showing
the widespread continued use of wiretaps without legal authority, Congress
passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968,29 also known as the Wiretap Act, which established stringent warrant
procedures for monitoring and recording telephone calls that prosecutors
must follow to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment for use in criminal
investigations. I’ll talk about those judicially supervised procedures more in
a moment, but here again, you see Congress acting in response to actions by
the executive branch, and decisions by the judicial branch, in order to strike
a better balance between privacy rights and law enforcement.
But what about cases involving not just ordinary crimes, but national
security concerns? The Supreme Court had deliberately refused to reach
that question in Katz, noting in a footnote that “[w]hether safeguards other
than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amend-
ment in a situation involving the national security is a question not
24. Id. at 349.
25. Id. at 351.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 353.
28. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–351, Title III, § 802, 82
Stat. 212; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2018).
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presented in this case.”30 The Court did not consider, and did not decide,
whether there could be a national security exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment’s warrant requirement. And Title III, as originally drafted, included a
proviso that nothing therein “shall limit the constitutional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation
against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to
obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of
the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign
intelligence activities.”31
Indeed, national security surveillance authorized solely by the Presi-
dent was then ongoing, and largely not subject to judicial review of any
kind. For example, in May 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt author-
ized Attorney General Robert H. Jackson to use wiretapping in matters “in-
volving the defense of the nation,” and “electronic surveillance [was] used
. . . in domestic security cases at least since . . . 1946.”32 In my office, I
have a copy of the one-paragraph justification signed by FBI Director J.
Edgar Hoover during the administration of President John F. Kennedy, and
the signed authorization by Attorney General Robert Kennedy, permitting
the tapping of the telephone of the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, dated
October 10, 1963. Most famously, these practices intensified under Presi-
dent Richard Nixon, who blurred the line between foreign and domestic
security purposes and used wiretapping as a tool to identify political ene-
mies both abroad and at home. As you may know, these abuses were even-
tually uncovered, and aggressively investigated by the Church and Pike
committees in Congress.33 But the judiciary was also examining some of
these issues, as illustrated by the Keith case decided by the Supreme Court
in 1972.34
The Keith case arose from a criminal proceeding in the Eastern District
of Michigan, in which the United States charged three defendants with con-
spiracy to destroy government property.35 One of the defendants, Larry
Plamondon, an anti-Vietnam War activist, was charged with the dynamite
bombing of a CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan.36 During pretrial pro-
ceedings, it was revealed that the Attorney General had approved warrant-
30. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 n.23.
31. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 302 (1972) [hereinafter “Keith
case”].
32. Id. at 310 n. 10; see also Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the
Legality of the NSA Surveillance Program: the FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. LAW REV. 1023 (2008).
33. See Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976).
34. Keith case, 407 U.S. 297.
35. Id. at 299.
36. Id.
7
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less wiretaps “to gather intelligence information deemed necessary to pro-
tect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and sub-
vert the existing structure of the Government.”37 The government argued
that this was a reasonable exercise of the President’s constitutional power to
protect the national security and therefore no warrant was required.38 The
Court was faced with deciding, this time in a case that concededly did not
involve any foreign power or foreign intelligence, whether there is a na-
tional security exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.39
Once again, the Supreme Court managed to dodge the question, this
time by distinguishing between foreign intelligence and domestic intelli-
gence. The Court refused to say how it would rule if the case had involved
foreign threats, stating “this case involves only the domestic aspects of na-
tional security. We have not addressed, and express no opinion as to, the
issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or
their agents.”40 The Court also acknowledged the difference between at-
tempts to gather evidence for specific criminal prosecutions, which the gov-
ernment argued it was not initially engaged in here, and “surveillances . . .
directed primarily to the collecting and maintaining of intelligence with re-
spect to subversive forces,”—that is, “ongoing intelligence gathering,” as
authorized by the Attorney General in this case.41 But as to the latter, the
Court concluded that it would not make “the requested departure from
Fourth Amendment standards” because these circumstances did not “justify
complete exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior judicial
scrutiny.”42 It held that the government was required to follow “an appro-
priate warrant procedure” in this case.43
Interestingly, however, the Court signaled it was open to employing
different, and perhaps less stringent, warrant procedures in the domestic
intelligence context than in the realm of criminal investigations governed
by Title III. The Court said:
Given th[e] potential distinctions between Title III criminal surveillances
and those involving domestic security, Congress may wish to consider pro-
tective standards for the latter which differ from those already prescribed for
specified crimes in Title III. Different standards may be compatible with the
Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate
need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of
our citizens. For the warrant application may vary according to the govern-
37. Id. at 300 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 301.
39. Id. at 309.
40. Id. at 321–22.
41. Id. at 318–19.
42. Id. at 320.
43. Id.
8
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mental interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving pro-
tection.44
If Congress had responded to this invitation from the Supreme Court, per-
haps we would now have a DISA—that is, a Domestic Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act—in addition to a FISA. As it happened, however, given the wide
range of intelligence abuses by federal agencies, during administrations of
both parties, identified in the Church Committee Report, there was no appe-
tite in Congress to carve out a separate procedure for domestic intelligence
surveillance. Rather, distinguishing only between foreign intelligence sur-
veillance and domestic criminal prosecutions, Congress focused its energies
on developing FISA, to which I will now turn.
IV. FISA AND THE FISA COURTS: THE GRAND BARGAIN
Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978. It
is codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq. As originally enacted, FISA was
designed to provide a process for intelligence agencies to seek a warrant for
surveillance inside the United States of foreign powers and their agents.45
After I review for you what FISA, as originally conceived, authorizes, I will
describe what each branch of government gave and what each branch got
out of this grand bargain. At the most basic level, FISA gave a role to each
of the three branches of government in regulating foreign intelligence sur-
veillance, which, as is hopefully apparent from the historical background I
have just discussed, was not always the case.
FISA, simply put, authorizes the federal government to engage in four
types of investigative activity in connection with certain national security
investigations: (1) electronic surveillance; (2) physical searches; (3) the use
of pen registers and trap-and-trace devices; and (4) compelling the produc-
tion of tangible things.46 All of this activity must be directed at a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power.47 And for purposes of conducting
counter-terrorism investigations, terrorists are treated like agents of foreign
powers even if they owe allegiance to an international terrorist group,
which is treated akin to a non-nation State.
As with applications for Title III warrants in the federal criminal con-
text, FISA requires an affidavit of probable cause,48 although the probable
cause showing is distinct from that required under Title III. Instead of
showing that there is probable cause to believe that an individual is commit-
44. Id. at 322–23.
45. See generally An Act to Authorize Electronic Surveillance to Obtain Foreign Intelligence Infor-
mation, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat 1783 (1978).
46. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1822, 1842, 1861 (2018).
47. Id.
48. See generally Id. §§ 1804, 1823, 1842, 1861.
9
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ting, has committed, or is about to commit a particular enumerated offense,
a FISA affidavit must establish probable cause to believe: (1) that the target
of the surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power (which
can include agents of foreign political organizations and groups engaged in
international terrorism, as well as agents of foreign nations); (2) that each of
the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is
being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power; (3) that a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain
foreign intelligence information; and, (4) that appropriate minimization pro-
cedures are in place.49 Also distinct from a Title III warrant sought by
street-level case agents, FISA applications must be approved at the highest
levels of government, for example by the Attorney General or the Deputy
Attorney General, and must be certified by the President’s National Secur-
ity Advisor or an equally senior designee (often the FBI, CIA, or NSA
Director or Deputy Director).50
FISA also established the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(“FISC”), to review FISA applications and issue orders, and its Court of
Review, to hear government appeals from denials of applications or chal-
lenges by third parties ordered to produce information. The Chief Justice of
the United States designates federal district court judges to serve as judges
on the FISC; currently, there are 11 such judges who serve staggered seven-
year terms.51 The judges designated must represent at least seven of the
judicial circuits, and three of the judges must live within 20 miles of the
District of Columbia.52 The Chief Justice also appoints three federal circuit
court judges to the FISCR.53 I was appointed in 2014, and my term will end
in 2021. Appeals from the FISCR may be taken to the Supreme Court, but
to date the Supreme Court has not yet taken a case from the FISA courts.
So, what does the FISA application process look like? Applications are
generally presented to the duty judge by Justice Department attorneys from
the Office of Intelligence within the National Security Division on behalf of
the agency with primary investigative or intelligence gathering authority
over a particular matter.54 Those attorneys first file a proposed Application
for an Order, which is reviewed by legal advisors for the FISC. The legal
advisors oftentimes begin discussions with the government attorneys re-
garding the sufficiency of the probable cause showing and the scope of the
requested order. The FISC judge on duty to handle the application, after
49. Id. § 1804(a).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 1803(a)(1).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 1803(b).
54. Id. § 1803(a).
10
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consulting with his or her legal advisors, can approve or deny the applica-
tion or request additional modifications.55 About 20 to 25% of the time, the
FISC judge requires more information or better articulation of probable
cause. In the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts’s
most recent report to Congress, the FISC disclosed that it received 1,318
FISA applications in 2018.56 After consideration by the court, 985 orders
were granted, 261 orders were modified, 42 orders were denied in part, and
30 applications were denied in full.57 The 11 FISC judges examine the ap-
plications brought before them with a discerning eye and do not issue these
orders lightly. In no way is this court a “rubber stamp” for whatever the
government wants to do.
With this process in mind, and compared to how foreign intelligence
surveillance was conducted in the past, I think it is fair to say that each of
the three branches of government compromised in order to reach FISA’s
delicate balance. First, the executive branch: it gave up the potentially uni-
lateral authority to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance without any
oversight, left open by the Supreme Court’s decision in the Keith case, and
agreed that foreign intelligence surveillance conducted inside the United
States is to be governed by statute. In return, the executive gained legiti-
macy because its practices and procedures are endorsed by the legislature
and authorized by the judiciary, and the executive can rest assured that evi-
dence obtained after properly following FISA’s provisions can be used in
court should a prosecution ensue.
Next, the legislature: it gained the ability to oversee (through regular
reporting by the intelligence community) and to regulate (through over-
sight) the exercise of executive power that heretofore it had not touched. In
this regard, it is worth remembering that Congress still does not regulate
foreign intelligence surveillance conducted completely outside the United
States; that work is mostly governed by Executive Order 12333, which was
issued by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 under the President’s constitu-
tional authority over foreign relations and as the Commander in Chief.58
Congress also gained oversight power through its intelligence committees,
including the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, both established shortly before
FISA was passed,59 and the judiciary committees of both chambers. Under-
55. Id. § 1804(c).
56. Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Report of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on Activities of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts for
2018, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/G2M2-
CT4R.
57. Id.
58. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 FR 59941 (1981).
59. H.R. Res. 658, 95th Cong. (1977); S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976).
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standably, however, congressional oversight of foreign intelligence surveil-
lance mostly happens behind closed doors, which is a departure from Con-
gress’s usual practice of conducting all proceedings in public; the reason is
to prevent the disclosure of the methods and means by which intelligence
agencies gather specific information and to protect ongoing investigations.
Finally, the judiciary: it gained oversight over an individualized war-
rant procedure for the kind of national security surveillance that might im-
pact U.S. citizens that it had previously steered clear of reviewing. Rather
than simply deferring to the President’s Article II responsibility to protect
the security of the nation, the judiciary, at least as to foreign intelligence
surveillance conducted within the United States, now had a clearly-articu-
lated role to play. But this role raises some interesting questions. For exam-
ple, does an application to conduct surveillance under FISA satisfy Article
III’s case or controversy requirement? Unlike with Title III warrant proce-
dures, where it is understood that obtaining a warrant is very likely ancillary
to a subsequent criminal prosecution and adversary proceedings to chal-
lenge its issuance or execution, surveillance conducted under a FISA order
may not lead to any further proceedings in court. And given that the FISA
application process is conducted ex parte, and often only the government’s
position is represented, how can it be said that the process involves a case
or controversy? This question only intensified after FISA was amended in
the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to include authority not just over appli-
cations for individualized surveillance orders, but issuance of orders under
Section 702.60 These orders either approve or find deficient the govern-
ment’s proposed annual procedures for the targeting within the United
States of persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States, with-
out individualized judicial findings of probable cause as to each target.61 To
put it another way, Section 702 governs the collection, within the United
States, of communications of non-U.S. persons outside of the United States
when those communications transit portions of the Internet backbone in the
U.S. or are handled by U.S. service providers.
Section 702 could be the topic of a whole separate lecture, but for now,
I simply wish to note that FISA court proceedings (especially when it
comes to the approval of Section 702 procedures) are unlike any other pro-
ceedings in the federal court system. They, therefore, can be seen as a form
of judicial compromise, albeit a greatly beneficial compromise because they
now allow judicial oversight of what had previously been an entirely un-
supervised executive function.
60. Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008).
61. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j) (2018).
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V. LAW ENFORCEMENT VERSUS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING:
THE “PRIMARY PURPOSE” TEST AND THE WALL
The last set of developments I want to discuss tonight brings us to the
end of the twentieth century and the immediate aftermath of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. As you have heard, FISA grew out of the
distinction between surveillance for law enforcement purposes and surveil-
lance for foreign intelligence gathering. That distinction continued to gener-
ate vexing legal questions after FISA’s 1978 passage, which had to be
squarely addressed after 9/11.
FISA, as originally drafted, required the executive branch to certify, in
its application, “that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign
intelligence information.”62 But as part of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,
that language was changed so that the executive must certify “that a signifi-
cant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence informa-
tion.”63 Why was this change made?
In part, the change arose out of the fact that the Supreme Court had
not—and to this day still has not—decided whether there is a national se-
curity exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Although
FISA provided statutory procedures understood to comport with the Fourth
Amendment because FISA applications are focused on foreign intelligence,
federal courts after the Keith case and around the time of FISA’s passage
still wrestled with how to undertake a Fourth Amendment analysis in cases
involving both foreign intelligence gathering and domestic law enforce-
ment. This is best illustrated by the Fourth Circuit’s Truong case, decided in
1980.64
David Truong and Ronald Humphrey were convicted of espionage,
conspiracy to commit espionage, and several other offenses for transmitting
classified U.S. government information to representatives of the govern-
ment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.65 The warrantless searches and
surveillance that led to their convictions were conducted before the passage
of FISA, so the Fourth Circuit was essentially faced with the question that
the Supreme Court had left open in the Keith case: namely, is there a na-
tional security exception to the warrant requirement when it comes to for-
eign intelligence? The Fourth Circuit said yes.
The court reasoned that “because of the need of the executive branch
for flexibility, its practical experience, and its constitutional competence,
62. An Act to Authorize Electronic Surveillance to Obtain Foreign Intelligence Information, Pub.
L. No. 95-511, § 104, 92 Stat 1783 (emphasis added).
63. 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (2002) (emphasis added).
64. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
65. Id. at 911.
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the courts should not require the executive to secure a warrant each time it
conducts foreign intelligence surveillance.”66 Importantly, however, the
court held that:
[T]he executive should be excused from securing a warrant only when the
surveillance is conducted “primarily” for foreign intelligence reasons . . .
because once surveillance becomes primarily a criminal investigation, the
courts are entirely competent to make the usual probable cause determina-
tion, and because, importantly, individual privacy interests come to the fore
and government foreign policy concerns recede when the government is pri-
marily attempting to form the basis for a criminal prosecution.67
FISA, as originally drafted, appears to satisfy the Fourth Circuit’s pri-
mary purpose test, and was interpreted in that manner. But the Justice De-
partment had growing concerns, as demonstrated during the Aldrich Ames
espionage prosecution in 1994, that due to the “numerous prior consulta-
tions between FBI agents and prosecutors, the judge might rule that the
FISA warrants [obtained in that case] had been misused”68—that is, that the
line between surveillance for foreign intelligence information and surveil-
lance for domestic law enforcement had been crossed. In 1995, Attorney
General Janet Reno, with the assistance of Deputy Attorney General Jamie
Gorelick, issued formal procedures aimed at managing information sharing
between the FBI, on the intelligence side, and Justice Department prosecu-
tors, on the criminal side.69 Over time, these procedures came to be referred
to as “the wall,” and they eventually came under criticism after 9/11 for
“block[ing] the arteries of information sharing” that might have prevented
the attacks.70
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the wall came down, with Attor-
ney General John Ashcroft directing as much information sharing as possi-
ble, and Congress changing the “purpose” language in the FISA statute.
FISA now provides that obtaining foreign intelligence information need
only be “a significant purpose” of the surveillance. But would the Fourth
Amendment still be satisfied if the primary purpose of surveillance con-
ducted under FISA was law enforcement, and gathering foreign intelligence
information was only a secondary purpose? That question came before the
FISC, and then the FISCR, in 2002 in In re Sealed Case.71
In In re Sealed Case, the government appealed from an order of the
FISC imposing certain requirements and limitations regarding FISA sur-
66. Id. at 914.
67. Id. at 915 (emphasis added).
68. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 78 (Official Government ed. 2004).
69. Id. at 79.
70. Id. at 79–80.
71. 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
14
Montana Law Review, Vol. 80 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/1
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-2\MON201.txt unknown Seq: 15  1-AUG-19 11:49
2019 THE HISTORY OF FISA’S GRAND BARGAIN 151
veillance.72 Specifically, the FISC had ordered that “law enforcement offi-
cials shall not make recommendations to intelligence officials concerning
the initiation, operation, continuation or expansion of FISA searches or sur-
veillances” and that the FBI and DOJ “shall ensure that law enforcement
officials do not direct or control the use of the FISA procedures to enhance
criminal prosecution, and that advice intended to preserve the option of a
criminal prosecution does not inadvertently result in the Criminal Divi-
sion’s directing or controlling the investigation using FISA searches and
surveillances toward law enforcement objectives.”73 The FISCR, however,
pointed out that “[t]he ‘wall’ emerges from the [FISC]’s implicit interpreta-
tion of FISA”—the same wall that the language change in the USA PA-
TRIOT Act was intended to tear down.74
In re Sealed case goes on to thoroughly rebut any notion that FISA, as
written in 1978, included a “primary purpose” test, and points out that
Truong was not a FISA decision and dealt only with the Fourth Amendment
and the boundaries of the President’s inherent executive authority.75 And
the FISCR noted that by “assert[ing] authority to govern the internal organi-
zation and investigative procedures of the Department of Justice which are
the province of the Executive Branch (Article II) and the Congress (Article
I),” the FISA court “may well have exceeded the constitutional bounds that
restrict an Article III court.”76 In other words, the FISCR apparently felt
that the FISC was not sticking to the grand bargain and that the delicate
balance was becoming unsteady.
Ultimately, In re Sealed case concluded that the PATRIOT Act “elimi-
nated any [statutory] justification for the FISA court to balance the relative
weight the government places on criminal prosecution as compared to other
counterintelligence purposes.”77 And without concluding that a FISA order
is “a ‘warrant’ contemplated by the Fourth Amendment,” the FISCR held
that “FISA as amended is constitutional because the surveillances it autho-
rizes are reasonable.”78 After In re Sealed case, the wall—at least with re-
spect to the FISA courts—had well and truly crumbled. In order to satisfy
the requirements of FISA and the Fourth Amendment, the government is
not required to show that its primary purpose for engaging in surveillance is
to gather foreign intelligence information. The balance was shifted through
legislation and subsequent judicial interpretation, and there it currently re-
mains.
72. Id. at 720.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 721.
75. Id. at 725–26.
76. Id. at 731.
77. Id. at 735.
78. Id. at 741, 746.
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VI. CONCLUSION
There is much more to say about the evolution of FISA since 2002,
including the addition of Section 702, the bulk collection of metadata at one
time, but no longer, previously conducted under Section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act, and the ongoing changes underway as various provisions of
post-9/11 legislation reach their sunsets. However, I fear I would keep you
here all night if I tried to discuss each of them with you. Instead, I hope that
you take away a few key concepts from today’s national security history
lesson. First, that FISA, and the FISA courts, were created to provide an
important check on executive power. That role is just as important today as
it was in 1978, perhaps even more so in light of current events. Second, that
each of the three branches of government worked together to reach the
grand bargain that FISA represents, and that they continue to give and take
as technology continues to evolve and as the United States continues to face
threats both internal and external.
I sincerely hope you trust that the judiciary takes its constitutional and
statutory oversight responsibilities very seriously; the executive appreciates
that its agencies’ determined efforts to protect the country from espionage
and terrorist attack must comport with the fundamental principles embodied
in our Constitution as judges interpret the law to guide their work; and,
Congress continues to refine the statutory scheme in order to achieve the
best possible balance between individual privacy and national security.
Each branch, throughout FISA’s complex history, has earnestly at-




Montana Law Review, Vol. 80 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/1
